Transparency-based policies are currently the principal approach to mitigating the resource curse in developing countries, particularly with respect to corruption and conflict. Policymaking often reflects conventional assumptions about the nature of the problem: the traditional financial opacity of the extractive industries enables illicit appropriation of resource rents, while correlations between natural resource dependency and intrastate conflict are explained through reference to combatant financing mechanisms. Accordingly, transparency has been widely adopted as an integral policy component, whether through financial regulation, commodity
Introduction
This chapter critically examines policy responses to corruption and conflict in natural resource-dependent developing countries, including conceptual linkages made between the resource curse and transparency. The first section explores these concepts, while the ensuing discussion summarizes their institutional manifestation in terms of transparency-based initiatives, advocacy campaigns, laws, and policies intended to reduce corruption and resolve conflict related to the extractive industries: UN commodity sanctions regimes, the Kimberley Process, codes of conduct and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, and the policies of intergovernmental organizations. The General Assembly adopted the UN Convention Against Corruption, which mentions the term "transparency" no fewer than ten times, in 2003. Similarly, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which were first drafted in 1976, underwent substantial revisions in 2000, including updated provisions for corporate disclosure and a new section on anti-corruption measures. Meanwhile, the international financial institutions (IFIs) have also introduced transparency stipulations into their operating procedures and lending requirements. For example, each of the multilateral development banks now has formal policies on access to internal documentation. These reforms may have been prompted by a few different reasons: escalating pressure from civil society, such as public protest at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in 1999; a realization that allowing increased transparency could mitigate demands for more substantive organizational reforms, including the democratization of decision making; and an awareness that transparency also complemented the prevailing "Washington Consensus" agenda regarding good governance for World Bank and IMF recipient countries (Blanton 2007 
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Institutional history
The following discussion traces how concepts and theories about the resource curse and PWYP calls for full disclosure in three areas: payments by resource corporations to the countries where they operate, revenues earned by governments from the extractive industries, and licensing arrangements and contracts. The underlying assumption is that publicly available information regarding precisely how much governments earn from oil/gas and mining will then reduce corruption (i.e., more fiscal transparency will yield better political accountability). PWYP also recognizes the importance of civil society in resource-dependent countries as part of the potential equation for better accountability of governments. National coalitions have been formed by PWYP members in at least thirty countries for this purpose, but it is debatable to what extent these have been effective in practice. Perhaps most importantly thus far, the PWYP advocacy campaign was the principal catalyst for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Overall, PWYP is more comprehensive in its advocacy for disclosure by corporations and governments than EITI (they differ regarding contracts and licensing arrangements). EITI consequently has more backing from both corporations and governments than PWYP. Corporations typically consider the details of contracts to be proprietary information, the disclosure of which may put them at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other firms; while numerous governments for various reasons (e.g., protecting sovereignty, maintaining negotiating leverage, or concealing corruption) have also resisted disclosing contractual information such as concession agreements and signing bonuses.
UN sanctions regimes
Initially launched by the UK in 2002, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative now includes thirty-five countries in various stages of implementation (eleven countries are EITI "compliant" and twenty-four are EITI "candidates"). EITI utilizes a multi-stakeholder format that also includes participation by more than fifty of the world's largest oil and mining companies; the PWYP coalition and other civil society organizations; and the World Bank, the IMF, and regional development banks, which also supply financing and technical assistance to EITI. At first glance, EITI's approach appears to be straightforward: companies disclose what they pay to governments, governments disclose what they receive from companies, and the two sets of data are independently verified, with oversight by a multi-stakeholder group. However, there are several weaknesses within EITI that detract from its potential as an anti-corruption mechanism. First, numerous countries and corporations remain outside the EITI framework, approaches reviewed in this chapter (or perhaps other international initiatives such as the Open Government Partnership) will prove effective in reducing corruption and resolving conflict in natural resource-dependent states. In other words, can mechanisms be facilitated so that citizenry can hold their own governments accountable? The evidence to date indicates that predominant assumptions regarding how increased economic transparency translates into improved political accountability may be overstated, although this does not mean that one should therefore take corporate claims about the efficacy of industry self-regulation at face value (as private profit motive and societal good frequently diverge) and oppose modest reforms such as the DoddFrank Act. But the mixed track record of transparency-based policies does imply that practitioners should be realistic about the limitations of existing mechanisms so that they do not preclude further policy innovation.
To a certain extent, development processes in natural resource exporting developing countries will also be contingent on the evolution of relations with natural resource importing countries, particularly the emerging economies of China and India. Currently, China and India are the second and fourth largest consumers and net importers of oil in the world, with future consumption and imports projected to increase. Despite the principle of co-development that dates back to the Bandung Conference of 1955, the reality is that the benefits of increased South-South trade have essentially accrued disproportionately to the emerging countries importing natural resources more than to the developing countries exporting natural resources. The lack of engagement by Chinese and Indian firms with Western-initiated, transparency-based programs has been criticized, but it is precisely this "no-strings" approach-including with respect to associated soft loans and other development projects-that many governments in developing countries find particularly appealing. Of course, as China and India have found with respect to conflict associated with the oil industry in Sudan and South Sudan, there are also inevitable limits to the principle of non-intervention, as increased investment also compels deeper political engagement. How the risks of operating in natural resource exporting countries affected by corruption and conflict are negotiated by the governments and firms of natural resource importing countries-both developed and emerging-will have a strong bearing on whether the former manage to escape the resource curse. Whether or not future risk mitigation by states and corporations integrally incorporates aspects of transparency or alternative approaches emerge instead remains to be seen.
